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Abstract 
We outline a way to use Goguen’s (2006) account of concep-
tual blending in the cognitive architecture ACT-R. Despite re-
cent advances in linguistics and general accounts of concep-
tual blending (for example, Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 
2008) it has received scant attention in cognitive modelling, 
which is partly due to the fact that there are hardly any 
computational accounts of this phenomenon, Goguen’s being 
one of them. 
Keywords: conceptual blending; metaphor; analogy; linguist-
ics; conceptualisation; scientific creativity; ACT-R; Theory of 
Institutions. 
Analogy, metaphor, conceptual blending 
A major factor for the power and flexibility of the human 
cognitive system is its ability to create new concepts, in par-
ticular by combining existing ones. It is both central in cre-
ating new scientific ideas as well as for ‘everyday’ thinking. 
We are particularly interested in the role of this mental ma-
chinery in the creation of new mathematical concepts 
(Guhe, Smaill and Pease 2009). Most current accounts of 
scientific creativity emphasise the role of analogy (Gentner 
& Markman, 1997) or metaphor  (Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). 
Here, we outline the more general process of conceptual 
blending, its role in creating new concepts, and how it can 
be integrated into the cognitive architecture ACT-R 
(Anderson, 2007). 
Analogy and metaphor, which we take to be essentially 
the same, are cognitive processes that (1) establish map-
pings between parts of a cognitive system’s knowledge rep-
resentations (usually called domains) and that (2) can trans-
fer knowledge between domains for which a mapping was 
established. For example, in the extensively studied meta-
phor TIME IS SPACE, the expression Christmas is two days 
away recasts an event (Christmas) as a location with respect 
to the speaker’s current location in time by specifying a 
temporal interval (two days) as a distance.  
According to Fauconnier and Turner (2002) metaphors 
and analogies are only special cases of conceptual blending. 
A metaphor is simply a ‘cross space mapping’ (Goguen, 
2006, p. 8). The TIME IS SPACE metaphor, for example, not 
only provides the basic mapping, but allows reconceptuali-
sations as well as the integration of knowledge from other 
domains. A common reconceptualisation of the TIME IS 
SPACE conceptual blend is, for example, a change in per-
spective, where time is conceptualised as passing a static 
observer, e.g. in the expression Time passes slowly 
(Fauconnier and Turner 2008). It is important to note that a 
metaphorical or analogical mapping alone cannot account 
for this additional mental flexibility. 
Goguen’s approach 
Fauconnier and Turner’s account of concept blending is not 
directly suited for computational cognitive modelling, be-
cause it remains purely descriptive. Goguen (2006) outlines 
a computational account of conceptual blending – based on 
Fauconnier and Turner – using the theory of Institutions, a 
theory similar to Information Flow, which we used earlier 
(Guhe, Smaill, & Pease, 2009).  
We cannot go into much detail here, so we will restrict 
ourselves to one of Goguen’s (2006) motivating examples 
of a conceptual blend between the concepts HOUSE and 
BOAT, resulting in the conceptual blends HOUSEBOAT and 
BOATHOUSE, cf. Figure 1 for a depiction of the HOUSEBOAT 
blend. A base domain (shown at the bottom) provides the 
‘glue’ needed for mapping two domains (in the middle, left 
and right) and creating a conceptual blend (at the top). The 
most important mapping here is the one of live-in and ride, 
which provides the reconceptualisation of a BOAT as an 
OBJECT in which a person can not only RIDE but also LIVE. 
Goguen restricts the many possible conceptual blends by 
specifying sortal frames, which must match in order for a 
mapping between domains to succeed. Sortal restrictions are 
 
 
 
Figure 1: HOUSEBOAT conceptual blend 
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specified in a signature, for example for the HOUSEBOAT 
case Goguen defines the following sortal frames: 
Transfer to ACT-R 
The translation of Goguen’s proposal to ACT-R (Anderson, 
2007) is rather straightforward. In our prototypical imple-
mentation, facts are represented as chunks and the matching 
and transfer operations are realised with production rules. 
The one major problem is that ACT-R does not have a sortal 
mechanism comparable to Goguen’s. Although ACT-R uses 
sorts (in the form of chunk types), it does not automatically 
check for super-/subsort relations like in Goguen’s concep-
tion. This means, for example, that WATER is not automati-
cally understood to match frames specifying MEDIUM. Thus, 
the mapping of on(house, land) to on(boat, water) fails, be-
cause these facts cannot be linked via the base domain (by 
using on(object, medium)). We outline two basic solutions 
below. Which one provides a better model of the cognitive 
mechanisms will have to be established experimentally. 
Solution 1 – Explicit sortal checks 
The first solution is to explicitly perform sortal checks with 
a set of production rules. For such a model we coded infor-
mation about subsorts as chunks of type 
(chunk-type is-subsort sort1 sort2) 
The production rules performing the sortal checks keep 
the information about the two facts that are being compared 
in the imaginal buffer while the information about the sortal 
hierarchy is retrieved from the declarative memory. 
A variant for faster processing is to include sortal infor-
mation with the facts, e.g. for predicates: 
(chunk-type predicate name result-sort  
            par1 sort1 par2 sort2) 
The major disadvantage of this solution is that the repre-
sentations contain much redundancy and do not provide the 
usual generalisations, e.g. that WATER is a subsort of ME-
DIUM. 
Solution 2 – Amending the declarative module 
An alternative solution is to change ACT-R on the architec-
tural level, i.e. to amend the declarative module. A rather 
mild extension is to provide the declarative module with 
sortal information (e.g. a lattice of sorts) and let it consider 
not only chunks that directly match the sort of the chunk 
(i.e., that match in the isa slot) but also chunks that have a 
supersort of the chunk being requested. 
A more severe alteration is to check all slot values that a 
chunk specifies and match not only the values themselves 
but check for values higher up in the sortal hierarchy. For 
example, if a request to the declarative module specifies a 
chunk with a slot–value pair like 
retrieval> 
isa predicate  
name on  
par1 house … 
the par1 slot would also match for chunks like: 
retrieval> 
isa predicate  
name on  
par1 object … 
Solution 2 predicts much faster processing than solution 1, 
because all checks are performed within one memory re-
trieval. Thus, it neither requires firing multiple productions 
nor multiple retrievals from declarative memory. 
Conclusion 
Conceptual blending is a central, powerful and productive 
aspect of human cognition, allowing, for example, to con-
ceptualise time in terms of space. However, cognitive mod-
elling has not yet seriously addressed this issue. We outlined 
in broad terms a way to transfer Goguen’s notion of concep-
tual blending into the cognitive architecture ACT-R as a 
first step to include conceptual blending in cognitive models 
of scientific creativity, in particular mathematical thinking. 
Whether a modification of ACT-R’s declarative module will 
provide better cognitive adequacy will have to be decided 
on the basis of empirical data. 
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resident: → Person  passenger : → Person  
house : → Object  boat : → Object 
land, water: → Medium  land, water: →Medium 
livein : Person Object → Bool  ride : Person Object → Bool 
on: Object Medium → Bool on: Object Medium → Bool 
livein(resident, house)  ride(passenger, boat) 
on(house, land) on(boat, water) 
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